Official turnover, political connections and enterprise subsidies evidence from China

Official turnover, political connections and enterprise subsidies : evidence from China

Bibliographic Details
Statement of responsibility:Li Ji and Wei Zhang
Published in:Emerging markets, finance and trade. - Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2002. - 60(2024), 2, Seite 282-291
Main Author: Ji, Li (Author)
Other Authors: Zhang, Wei (Author)
Format: electronic Article
Language:English
Published: 2024
ISSN:1558-0938
External Sources:lizenzpflichtig
lizenzpflichtig
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982 |2 26  |1 00  |x DE-206  |b This paper investigates the role of political connections in Chinese industrial enterprises receiving government fiscal subsidies. Using data on local officials and enterprises in China, we empirically examine how changes in political connections - due to turnover of key local government officials - impact enterprise subsidies. We find that enterprise subsidies decrease significantly in the year when local officials' turnover. However, subsidies change less significantly when the local party secretary is promoted locally or has greater incentives for promotion. The impact of changing political connections is greater for non-state-owned enterprises and large-scale enterprises. Our research helps understand the dynamics between local governments and markets in China. It also has important implications for regulating how subsidies are distributed.